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INTRODUCTION
Media policy is designed in large part to support high-fidelity information—news with a signal-to-noise ratio necessary for self-government. Federal broadcast regulations, the Supreme Court precedents upholding them, investments in public media, and journalistic norms all seek to support an
informed citizenry and glorify the predicate values of truth and robust debate.
“Signal,” in this context, is information that is truthful and supportive of democratic discourse. “Noise” misinforms and undermines discursive potential.
When signal overpowers noise, there is high fidelity in the information environment.
Policymakers and the public are outraged at digital information platforms
(“platforms” or “digital platforms”) variously for the platforms’ roles in promoting noise via disinformation and hate speech.1 This rage is fomenting calls
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to break up the platform companies. Reducing platform size may address some
aspects of overweening power, but antitrust law will not correct problematic
information dynamics. For one thing, splintered companies are likely to reconsolidate. For another, if more small companies simply replicate the same
practices, similar patterns are likely to emerge with different owners.2 Diverse
ownership is a justly enduring value in media policy, but not a panacea.
A distinct and often complementary approach to antitrust is regulation.
Digital platforms have operated largely free from the media regulations. So too,
they have been untethered by the norms around media responsibility, and associated legal liability, that have constrained publishers. Transparency rules and
norms have never applied to digital platforms, but have long been useful for fidelity. In analog commercial and political advertising, rules require sponsorship
identification on the theory that if people know who is speaking, they will better be able to filter out noise. Because disclosure mandates increase information, rather than suppress it, transparency policies fare well from the free
speech perspective. It is thus natural that transparency would top policy agendas as the cure-all or at least a “cure-enough” for online harms. As governments now begin to close the digital loophole and extend analog-era regulations
to digital flows of information, we should understand the limits of these moves.
Transparency alone is no match for platform design choices that degrade
fidelity. Algorithmic amplification creates a digital undertow that weakens
cognitive autonomy and makes it difficult for people to sift signal from noise.
Merely importing analog-era regulations into the digital realm will not adequately reckon with how meaning is made online. If the internet is a stack of
functions, with data transmission at the bottom, and content at the top, traditional transparency happens at the surface where content emerges. But it is
lower down the stack where cascades of individual actions, paid promotions,
and platform priorities determine how messages move. Meaning is made where
likes and shares and algorithmic optimizing minutely construct audiences,
where waves of disinformation swell and noxious speech gathers energy. Increasing fidelity by empowering individual autonomous choice will require
both transparency and other interventions at the level of system architecture. To
this end, disclosures should cover the reach and targeting of recommended and
sponsored messages.
One way to understand disclosure rules is that they create friction in digital
flows—friction that opens pathways for reflection. Disclosures that contextual1

See, e.g., Andrew Marantz, Opinion, Free Speech Is Killing Us, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/opinion/sunday/free-speech-social-media-violence.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/5H8E-R9NF] (summarizing public rage as “noxious speech” and comparing it to pollution).
2
Cf. Carl Shapiro, Protecting Competition in the American Economy: Merger Control, Tech
Titans, Labor Markets, 33 J. ECON. PERSPS. 69, 79 (2019) (arguing that competition may not
“provide consumers with greater privacy or would better combat information disorder; unregulated competition might instead trigger a race to the bottom, and many smaller firms
might be harder to regulate than a few large ones.”).
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ize the objectives or origins or reliability of information interrupt the chain of
transmission. In this sense, they are a form of “meaningful inefficiency” that
fosters civic engagement.3 Disclosure is not the only frictive intervention. Other
sources of friction would be queries to users about whether they really want to
circulate hate or lies in order to check impulsive high frequency misinformation trading. Such forms of salubrious friction could disincentivize and
disrupt practices that addict, surveil, and dull critical functions. New sources of
friction can slow the pull of low-fidelity information and equip people to resist
it.
Part I will briefly describe the historic relationship between American media policy and information fidelity, focusing on transparency rules and the reliance on listener cognitive autonomy. Part II will show how analog-era transparency rules are being adapted for digital platforms with a view toward
restoring and protecting autonomy. Part III will discuss the ways in which these
transparency solutions alone cannot cope with algorithmic noise and suggests
that more systemic transparency is necessary. Part IV will propose that new
sources of friction in information flows may be needed to foster information
fidelity amidst the algorithmic production of salience.
I.

HIGH-FIDELITY INFORMATION AND MEDIA POLICY

The development of American twentieth-century media, was, as Paul Starr
argues, inextricably tied to liberal constitutionalism and its values of truth, reasoned discourse, and mental freedom.4 This linkage was reflected in media policies that yoked regulation to safeguarding autonomy5 and encouraging democratic participation.6 A principal media policy goal has been to boost
information fidelity, or the signal-to-noise ratio, in the service of democratic
processes.7 The signal is information necessary to self-government characterized by accuracy, relevance, diversity of views, and similar values. As Justice
Stephen Breyer put it, “[C]ommunications policy . . . seeks to facilitate the public discussion and informed deliberation, which . . . democratic government
presupposes.”8
3

This phrase comes from ERIC GORDON & GABRIEL MUGAR, MEANINGFUL INEFFICIENCIES:
CIVIC DESIGN IN AN AGE OF DIGITAL EXPEDIENCY 7–8 (2020) (identifying and analyzing the
introduction of “meaningful inefficiencies” into public processes to foster engagement and
understanding).
4
PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS 390, 391 (2004).
5
See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 5 (1989).
6
See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2356 (2000).
7
See, e.g., In Re Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d
143, 151 (1969) (“Rigging or slanting the news is a most heinous act against the public interest—indeed, there is no act more harmful to the public's ability to handle its affairs.”).
8
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 226–27 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part).
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Digital platforms can overwhelm signal with noise. Scale and speed, user
propagation, automated promotion, inauthentic and hidden amplification, and
the mixture of sponsored and organic speech all make digital discourse different. Alongside these technical differences are sociopolitical ones. Digital platforms emerged from the world of software engineering, not the press. They are
not inextricably tied to liberal constitutionalism. They stumbled into media
without the norms or bonds of twentieth-century professionalized press traditions or regulatory pressures. It is therefore not shocking that platform architecture not only tolerates but even favors low-fidelity speech.9 Accuracy has little
structural advantage in the attention economy.10 Deepfakes that alter image or
sound, bot-generated narratives masquerading as groundswell truths, and other
social media contrivances amplify disinformation and can create epistemic
bubbles. Algorithmic systems deliver content to audiences deemed receptive
based on data-inferred characteristics.11 This delivery system has design features like the infinite scroll or social rewards of provocation that bypass listeners’ cognitive checks and autonomous choice.12 The result is a noisy information environment that is inhospitable to the production of shared truths and
the trust necessary for self-government.13
American media policy can do very little to eradicate noise. For the most
part, the First Amendment is hostile to bureaucratic judgments about infor9

This seems to be truer on the right of the political spectrum than on the left. See YOCHAI
BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND
RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 383–84 (2018). Information gluts and poor-quality
information were anticipated, if downplayed, byproducts of low-cost speech distribution.
Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1838 (1995) (“But
when speakers can communicate to the public directly, it’s possible their speech will be less
trustworthy: They might not be willing to hire fact checkers, or might not be influenced
enough by professional journalistic norms, or might not care enough about their long-term
reputation for accuracy.”).
10
See Claire Wardle, Fake News. It's Complicated, FIRST DRAFT (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://firstdraftnews.org/latest/fake-news-complicated [https://perma.cc/LT3Q-9XLB].
11
See Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Think You’re Discreet Online? Think Again, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/21/opinion/computational-inference.htm
l (“Because of technological advances and sheer amount of data now available about billions
of other people, discretion no longer suffices to protect your privacy. Computer algorithms
and network analyses can now infer, with a sufficiently high degree of accuracy, a wide
range of things about you that you may have never disclosed, including your moods, your
political beliefs, your sexual orientation and your health.”).
12
See Chauncey Neyman, A Survey of Addictive Software Design 2–3 (June 2017) (unpublished senior project), https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11
27&context=cscsp [https://perma.cc/XN7W-SWTF]; Vian Bakir & Andrew McStay, Fake
News and the Economy of Emotions: Problems, Causes, Solutions, 6 DIGIT. JOURNALISM
154, 167 (2018).
13
See, e.g., PETER POMERANTSEV, THIS IS NOT PROPAGANDA: ADVENTURES IN THE WAR
AGAINST REALITY xv, 1 (2019); JASON STANLEY, HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS 5 (2015); Tim
Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT. INST. AT COLUMBIA
UNIV. (Sept. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete
[https://perma.cc/42F3-EQWD].
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mation quality. Aside from defamation actions and outside of advertising, the
law generally protects falsehoods from government censure.14 So strong is the
aversion to policing truth that investigative journalists who break the law in order to reveal truths enjoy less protection than those who misinform in order to
deceive.15 The constitutional tolerance for lies rests on the assumption that people can and will privilege truth if given the chance. This is the classic “marketplace of ideas” formulation of a free speech contest for mindshare.16 Truth is
expected to outperform lies so long as people are equipped to choose it.
A high-fidelity information environment in liberal democracies thus depends heavily on the exercise of cognitive autonomy: people reasoning for
17
themselves. Respect for autonomy is at the root of the First Amendment’s
guarantees of free speech, religion, assembly, and petition. So in a decision interpreting the First Amendment, Justice Louis Brandeis observed, “Those who
won our independence believed . . . that freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”18 From the heart of the First Amendment, the impulse to safeguard autonomous thought runs straight through the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable government searches. By impeding entry to the
house, the Constitution made it harder for government to enter the mind. Justice
Brandeis again: the Founders “sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.”19
Law developed over the twentieth century to safeguard the free mind from
deceptive messaging conveyed by mass communication, especially via the
mechanism of the disclosure requirements discussed below. There were other
broadcast law interventions—significant more for their rhetorical weight than
their operative force—that sought to prevent manipulation. Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) rules prohibit broadcast hoaxes and the intentional slanting of news: “[A]s public trustees, broadcast licensees may not intentionally distort the news. . . . ‘[R]igging or slanting the news is a most heinous
act against the public interest.’ ”20 Long ago, the FCC banned the broadcast of
14

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012).
See Michael C. Dorf & Sidney G. Tarrow, Stings and Scams: “Fake News,” the First
Amendment, and the New Activist Journalism, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 9, 19, 23, 28 (2017).
16
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”). Enlightenment antecedents abound. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 86
(David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003); JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 2 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1918).
17
See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 205, 220 (2000).
18
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). For autonomy
theories of the First Amendment, see generally Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 215–16, 218–20 (1972).
19
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20
FCC, MEDIA BUREAU, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING: HOW TO GET THE MOST SERVICE
FROM YOUR LOCAL STATION 12 (2019), https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/public-and15
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“functional music”—something like muzak—for fear that it would subliminally
seduce the public into a buying mood.21 What these regulatory examples show
is a concern for listener autonomy: that listeners not be deceived or lured into
false consciousness. So freed, the listener can presumably ensure for herself a
high-fidelity information diet.
The operation of autonomous choice to filter signal from noise, as it developed in the analog world, has to be understood against the backdrop of signalsupporting government policies and industry practices. Broadcasters have been
subject to public service requirements of various kinds, affirmative programming requirements for news, and the erstwhile “fairness requirements” to ventilate opposing viewpoints on controversial issues.22 The Public Broadcasting
Act23 established subsidies for noncommercial media that would
be responsive to the interests of people[,] . . . constitute an expression of diversity and excellence, . . . develop[] . . . programming that involves creative risks
and that addresses the needs of unserved and underserved audiences . . . [and]
constitute valuable local community resources for utilizing electronic media to
address national concerns and solve local problems.24

Broadcasters who are inclined to amplify deceptive messages might also be deterred by the spectrum licensing system, which at least formally subjects broadcasters to the risk that they will lose their licenses through petitions to deny renewals.25
More signal-boosting work was done by press norms and business structures. Defamation law incentivizes publishers to take care with the truth.
Newspaper mastheads lay responsibility for content at the feet of named publishers and editors. The professionalization of the news business led to norms
broadcasting.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B62-JR7R] (citing In Re Complaints Covering CBS
Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969)); see also Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1254–55 (1949). There was a recent congressional request to enforce this rule against Sinclair Broadcasting for alleged misrepresentations in news broadcasts. See Press Release, Sen. Tom Udall, Udall, Cantwell Lead
Colleagues in Call for FCC to Investigate Sinclair Broadcasting for News Distortion (Apr.
12, 2018), https://www.tomudall.senate.gov/news/press-releases/udall-cantwell-lead-colleag
ues-in-call-for-fcc-to-investigate-sinclair-broadcasting-for-news-distortion [https://perma.cc/
8PN5-Y2SW].
21
Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 544–45 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (considering a
challenge to the FCC regulation of muzak). Years later, the FCC also declared, without so
ordering, subliminal advertising unsuitable for broadcast. Public Notice, Broadcast of Information by Means of “Subliminal Perception” Techniques, 44 F.C.C.2d 1016, 1017 (1974)
(declaring that attempts “to convey information to the viewer by transmitting messages below the threshold level of normal awareness,” are “contrary to the public interest” because
such advertisements are “intended to be deceptive.”).
22
See STUART M. BENJAMIN & JAMES B. SPETA, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY
xxiv (4th ed. 2015).
23
47 U.S.C. § 396.
24
Id. § 396(a)(5)–(8).
25
Note, Use of Petitions by Minority Groups to Deny Broadcast License Renewals, 1978
DUKE L.J. 271, 271–84.
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of fact-checking and fidelity.26 Analog-era media economics tended to reward
high-fidelity news production.27 Local newspapers enjoyed near-monopoly
claims on advertising revenue that supported investigative journalists.28 Because news was bundled with entertainment and sports, media outlets crosssubsidized one with revenue from the other.29 These economics have of course
been upended in the digital world, where content bundles are disaggregated and
digital platforms absorb the advertising revenue needed for journalism—
without in fact producing it.
One other thing to note about the analog media environment that birthed
media policy is that analog information flows were much slower. The task of
filtering signal from noise was made easier simply by virtue of analog system
constraints. Attention abundance and content scarcity meant that more cognitive resources could be allocated to evaluating a particular piece of content.30
The information flow through newspapers and broadcast channels left time
enough to absorb disclosures or discriminate among messages. Perhaps most
significantly, the flow was not narrowcast. Noise in the form of lies or manipulation would be exposed to a large audience, which was itself a form of discipline and an opportunity for collective filtering.

26

See, e.g., Christopher Anderson, Journalism: Expertise, Authority, and Power in Democratic Life, in THE MEDIA AND SOCIAL THEORY 248, 248–49 (David Hesmondhalgh & Jason
Toynbee eds., 2008).
27
See generally VICTOR PICKARD, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT JOURNALISM? CONFRONTING THE
MISINFORMATION SOCIETY 8–10 (2020).
28
JAMES T. HAMILTON, DEMOCRACY'S DETECTIVES: THE ECONOMICS OF INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM 4, 8 (2016); EMILY BELL ET AL., THE PLATFORM PRESS: HOW SILICON VALLEY
REENGINEERED JOURNALISM 9 (2017), https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:15
dv41ns27 [https://perma.cc/DA6W-M6PL].
29
HAMILTON, supra note 28, at 17 (“Rather than have three different trucks deliver sports,
entertainment, and government news products, a newspaper gathered all these topics into one
bundle and delivered that to your home. This meant that content associated with many willing advertisers—real estate, automotive, food—was clustered with story topics few advertisers would seek out, such as poverty or disasters abroad.”); Derek Thompson, If You Don’t
Watch Sports, TV Is a Huge Rip-Off (So, How Do We Fix It?), THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/12/if-you-dont-watch-sports-tv-is-ahuge-rip-off-so-how-do-we-fix-it/265814/ [https://perma.cc/M5FR-ANE4] (“You could say
that TNT ‘Law and Order’ fans are subsidizing TNT basketball fans. But it’s also the case
that TNT basketball fans are keeping the lights on for TNT original dramas.”).
30
Cf. Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1420–21 (2004)
(describing audience and attention fragmentation in the early stages of digitalization); Wu,
supra note 13 (“The most important change in the expressive environment can be boiled
down to one idea: it is no longer speech itself that is scarce, but the attention of listeners.
Emerging threats to public discourse take advantage of this change. . . . [E]merging techniques of speech control depend on (1) a range of new punishments, like unleashing ‘troll
armies’ to abuse the press and other critics, and (2) ‘flooding’ tactics (sometimes called ‘reverse censorship’) that distort or drown out disfavored speech through the creation and dissemination of fake news, the payment of fake commentators, and the deployment of propaganda robots.”).
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With this background, we can turn to the transparency rules that developed
in the analog environment to safeguard cognitive autonomy and enhance information fidelity. It is the translation of these rules for digital platforms that is
the first order work of platform regulation.
II. FIDELITY OF MESSAGE—KNOW WHO’S TALKING TO YOU
In reaction to the social media disruptions of 2016—including foreign interference in the messaging around the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and
the presidential election in the United States—western democracies are considering or adopting laws to try to limit foreign political advertising and surreptitious messaging of all kinds.31 These interventions are forward-looking as well,
with an eye toward the expected onslaught of disinformation in future campaigns. At the same time, the largest social media platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, have taken voluntary steps to police inauthentic
accounts that violate their terms of service and to be more transparent about the
sources of political advertising.32
For the most part, the notion of transparency reflected in both mandated
and self-imposed measures is an old one: Individuals can be manipulated into
mistaking noise for signal if they don’t know who is speaking to them. Analogera transparency requirements took hold at the level of the message. That is,
disclosures about a particular advertisement or program were displayed simultaneously with the message in order to allow listeners to exercise autonomous
judgment about that message. The following shows how analog-era media
transparency rules tried to increase information fidelity and how these rules are
being adapted for digital flows.
A. Analog-Era Transparency Rules
Twentieth-century advertising and media law sought to advance information fidelity by increasing transparency of authorship, essentially to help listeners filter out noise. Without knowing who is behind a message, people might
be manipulated into believing what, in the light of disclosure, is unbelievable.
Concealed authorship slips messages past cognitive checks that safeguard freedom of mind.33 Disclosure mandates aim to restore these checks and enable listeners to apply cognitive resistance.
31

See e.g., LUIS ACOSTA ET AL., LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REGULATION OF FOREIGN
INVOLVEMENT IN ELECTIONS, LL File No. 2019-017776, at 1–2 (2019) (surveying laws in
Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Israel, Japan, Singapore,
South Africa, Sweden, and Turkey).
32
See Dawn C. Nunziato, Misinformation Mayhem: Social Media Platforms' Efforts to
Combat Medical and Political Misinformation, 19 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 32, 33–34, 61, 98
(2020).
33
See Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J.
497, 522–24 (2015) (describing manipulative marketing techniques that take advantage of
consumers' cognitive limitations); id. at 518–19, 524, 526–27, 529–30 (discussing manipula-

21 NEV. L.J. 623

Spring 2021]

DIGITAL FIDELITY AND FRICTION

631

Most of the analog-era source disclosures are tied to the message itself. For
example, print, radio, and television political advertising messages are subject
to disclosure requirements under the Federal Election Campaign Act.34 A “clear
and conspicuous”35 disclaimer is required to accompany certain “public communications” that expressly advocate for a candidate.36 The disclaimer identifies who paid for the message and whether it was authorized by the candidate.
The Supreme Court, in Citizens United v. FEC, found these requirements to be
justified by the government interest in ensuring that “ ‘voters are fully informed’ about . . . who is speaking.”37 In an earlier decision, Justice Antonin
Scalia celebrated the virtue of transparent political speech, writing, “Requiring
people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without
which democracy is doomed.”38
Disclosure law is also entrusted to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), whose predecessor agency started requiring sponsorship identification under the 1927 Radio Communications Act.39 The most notable expansion of these rules followed not a political event but the payola scandals in the
1950s when record labels bribed DJs to play their music, thus surreptitiously
appropriating the editorial role.40 It was then that Congress authorized the FCC
to require broadcasters to disclose paid promotions.41 Disclosure is required
when “any type of valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid or promised, charged or accepted” for the inclusion of a sponsored message in a broadcast.42 For controversial or political matters, disclosure is required even when

tive effect of covert advertising that evades critical evaluation); Lili Levi, A “Faustian
Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 696 (2015)
(explaining that product placement relies on what cognitive psychology calls System 1 cognitive processes—those rapid and unconscious biases and heuristics that tell us to trust).
34
52 U.S.C. § 30120(a)–(d).
35
11 C.F.R. § 110.11(c)(1) (2020).
36
2 U.S.C. § 441d(a); 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(a) (2020). Political committees must also include
a disclaimer in communications sent via email to more than five hundred recipients. See
Katherine Reynolds, Client Alert: FTC Releases Guidance on Internet Activity for Political
Committees Ahead of the 2020 Election, JDSUPRA (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.co
m/legalnews/client-alert-fec-releases-guidance-on-70027/ [https://perma.cc/GXA3-NTFS].
37
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 368 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
76 (1976)); see also id. at 368 (“Identification of the source of advertising may be required
as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which
they are being subjected.” (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792
n.32 (1978))).
38
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 228 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
39
For a brief history of sponsorship disclosure laws, see Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 98 (2006) [hereinafter Stealth Marketing].
40
See id. at 99.
41
47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1).
42
Letter from David H. Solomon, Chief, Enforcement Bureau, FCC, to Thomas W. Dean,
Litig. Dir., NORML Found., 16 FCC. Rcd. 1421, 1423 (Dec. 22, 2000).
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no consideration is paid.43 Behind this requirement is the idea that faked provenance prevents people from engaging with speech on the level and thereby
from exercising cognitive autonomy.44 As discussed below, these rules only
apply to the broadcast media, not to the internet.45
Another set of source disclosure rules comes from the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”). Once Madison Avenue had perfected techniques to bypass critical resistance to commercial messages, it became the job of the FTC to
protect consumers from being duped. Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the agency to police sponsored messages for unfairness
or deception.46 To reduce the likelihood that advertising would deceive by concealing motive or authorship, the FTC issued guidance about source disclosures
for paid product endorsements.47 These disclosures must be “clear and conspicuous” “to avoid misleading consumers.”48 Here, in theory, there is no digital
loophole. Clear and conspicuous guidelines also apply to digital advertisements
and to digital influencer sponsorship.49
Some analog-era disclosure rules, while still operating at the message level,
are meant for information intermediaries, rather than the listener. For example,
the FCC requires various kinds of “public file” submissions so that the public
can be made aware of how broadcasters approach their public interest obligations.50 Broadcasters also have to make disclosures about their ownership structure so as to inform the public who really holds their communicative power.51
So too, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) requires this kind of intermediary-focused disclosure about campaign contributions and spending.52

43

47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(2); see also H.R. REP. NO. 86-1800, at 3532 (1960) (stating that a
sponsorship identification announcement may be required for political programs or discussions of controversial issues even if “the matter broadcast is not ‘paid’ matter”).
44
Stealth Marketing, supra note 39, at 116 (“Whether the speech urges consumption, as in
advertising, or urges belief, as in propaganda, it aims to effect audience action through cognitive manipulation, rather than through persuasion.”).
45
Infra Section II.B.
46
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2).
47
16 C.F.R. § 255.0(a) (2020).
48
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Operation ‘Full Disclosure’ Targets More than 60
National Advertisers (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/
09/operation-full-disclosure-targets-more-60-national-advertisers [https://perma.cc/2XCX-L
WB4].
49
FED. TRADE COMM’N, .COM DISCLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES IN
DIGITAL ADVERTISING 2–3 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/pressreleases/ftc-staff-revises-online-advertising-disclosureguidelines/130312dotcomdisclosures.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XPQ-L2AB].
50
47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1943, 73.3526(a), 76.1700(a)–(c) (2020).
51
47 C.F.R. § 73.3526 (2020).
52
11 C.F.R. § 110.11(a) (2020).
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Though aimed at intermediaries, the objective of these disclosures is still to
help listeners understand who is speaking to them.53
B. Adaptation to Digital
The first rounds of proposals to regulate digital platforms more or less
adapt analog-era transparency requirements to the internet.54 They attack manipulation in the form of source concealment at the level of the message.
Most internet messaging is not covered under the election law term public
communication,55 and therefore there has been no FEC-required sponsorship
disclosure on digital platforms. Closing this sort of digital loophole is a
straightforward, though still unrealized, policy project.56 One of the first attempts to translate analog transparency regimes to the digital world in the United States was the Honest Ads Act, introduced for a second time in March
2019.57 Seeking to uphold the principle that “the electorate bears the right to be
fully informed,” the Act would close the digital loophole for online campaign
ads.58 Platforms would have to reveal the identities of political ad purchasers.59
While the Honest Ads Act is stalled in Congress as of this writing, several
states have moved forward to adopt similar legislation, including California,
Maryland, and New York.60
California’s Social Media DISCLOSE Act of 2018 extends political advertising sponsorship disclosure requirements to social media. 61 New York's De53

See generally WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO
REGULATION (1992) (discussing the different kinds of disclosure regimes).
54
For a handful of proposals, see Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” and Other Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223, 1255–56, 1260,
1262–63, 1267–68 (2018).
55
11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (2020) (defining “public communication”).
56
Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public Communication,” 83 Fed.
Reg. 12,864, 12,868–69 (proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110)
(proposing to modify 11 CFR Parts 100 and 110, either by extending existing political advertising disclaimer regulations to “internet communications” or by adopting a general rule that
all online advertising contain a “clear and conspicuous” disclaimer of source).
57
For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 4201–4202 (2019) (incorporating the
Honest Ads Act).
58
Id. § 4202.
59
Mark Warner, Summary of Proposed Honest Ads Act, WARNER.SENATE.GOV,
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/the-honest-ads-act?page=1 [https://perma.c
c/3ZTW-BQP4]; see also Mark Warner, Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of Social
Media and Technology Firms 12 (2018) [hereinafter Warner Policy Proposals] (unpublished
white paper draft), https://regmedia.co.uk/2018/07/30/warner_social_media_proposal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2R75-WK5Y]. For a more far-reaching proposal, see Wood & Ravel, supra
note 54, at 1264 (proposing disclosures also for unpaid ads and other communications).
60
Digital Political Ads, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www
.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/digital-political-ads.aspx [https://perma.cc/3WA
B-YXD7].
61
Social Media DISCLOSE Act, A.B. 2188, State Assemb., 2017–2018 Sess. § 2 (Cal.
2018).
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mocracy Protection Act of 2018 requires paid internet and digital political ads
to display disclaimers stating whether the ad was authorized by a candidate as
well as who actually paid for the ad.62 Washington State has altered its campaign finance laws to require disclosure of the names and addresses of political
ad sponsors and the cost of advertising.63 Canada enacted a law requiring that
platforms publish the verified real names of advertising purchasers.64
New technologies have created new threats to information fidelity. Bots
enable massive messaging campaigns that disguise authorship and thereby increase the perceived value or strength of an opinion.65 A substantial number of
tweeted links originate from fake accounts designed to flood the information
space with an opinion expressed so frequently that people believe it.66 Deepfakes create fraudulent impressions of authorship through ventriloquy, using
artificial intelligence to fake audio or video.67 Proposed and adopted laws to
address deepfakes and bot-generated speech are in the same tradition as the political and advertising disclosure requirements advanced to close the digital
loopholes. They seek to ensure that people are informed about who is speaking
to them (in the case of bots) and whether the speech is real (in the case of deepfakes).
California SB 100168 makes it illegal for a bot to communicate with someone with “the intention of misleading and without clearly and conspicuously
disclosing that the bot is not a natural person” and requires removal of offend62

Democracy Protection Act, A.B. 9930, State Assemb., 2017–2018 Sess. §§ 1, 2, 4, 7
(N.Y. 2018) (amending definition of “political communication” in N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-106
(McKinney 2019) and adding § 14-107(b) to require digital records of online platform independent expenditures).
63
H.B. 2938, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8 (Wash. 2018) (amending WASH. REV. CODE
§ 42.17A (2018)).
64
Elections Modernization Act, Bill C-76 § 208.1 (enacted as S.C. 2018, c 31 (Can.)) (replacing the Fair Elections Act, S.C. 2014, c 12). Akin to the situation in Washington State,
Jim Brunner & Christine Clarridge, Why Google Won't Run Political Ads in Washington
State for Now, SEATTLE TIMES (June 7, 2018, 6:23 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattl
e-news/google-halts-political-ads-in-washington-state-as-disclosure-law-goes-into-effect/
[https://perma.cc/WC65-34KS], Google pulled or blocked all ads that fell within C-76’s purview ahead of federal elections in March 2019. Tom Cardoso, Google to Ban Political Ads
Ahead of Federal Election, Citing New Transparency Rules, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 5, 2019),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-google-to-ban-political-ads-ahead-of-feder
al-election-citing-new/ [https://perma.cc/3HJR-Q58F].
65
Renee DiResta, Computational Propaganda: If You Make It Trend, You Make It True, 106
YALE REV. 12, 12, 14–15 (2018).
66
Stefan Wojcik et al., Bots in the Twittersphere, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2018),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/04/09/bots-in-the-twittersphere/ [https://perma.cc/8GXUMV5U] (finding two-thirds of tweeted links were bots); see also Madeline Lamo & M. Ryan
Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988, 990 (2019).
67
For a discussion on platform recommendations, see Deep Fakes and the Next Generation
of Influence Operations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/e
vent/deep-fakes-and-next-generation-influence-operations [https://perma.cc/568M-3KCZ].
68
S.B. 1001, 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified in CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17940
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 16 of 2021 Reg. Sess.)).

21 NEV. L.J. 623

Spring 2021]

DIGITAL FIDELITY AND FRICTION

635

ing accounts.69 It requires that any “automated online [“bot”] account” engaging a Californian on a purchase or a vote must identify itself as a bot.70 Notably,
the law makes clear that it “does not impose a duty on service providers of
online platforms.”71
At the federal level, the proposed Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act72
would clamp down on the use of social media bots by political candidates.
Candidates, their campaigns, and other political groups would not be permitted
to use bots in political advertising.73 Moreover, the FTC would be given power
to direct the platforms to develop policies requiring the disclosure of bots by
their creators/users.74 Another federal proposal would require platforms to identify inauthentic accounts and determine the origin of posts and/or accounts.75
Finally, the European Commission’s artificial intelligence ethics guidelines include a provision that users should be notified when they are interacting with
algorithms rather than humans. 76
Deepfakes are another technique to distort democratic discourse by concealing authorship.77 Facebook is entreating developers to produce better detection systems for deepfakes.78 Early legislative efforts at the federal level79 and

69

Selina Wang, California Would Require Twitter, Facebook to Disclose Bots, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 3, 2018, 1:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-03/californiawould-require-twitter-facebook-to-disclose-bots [https://perma.cc/F44E-XY2X] (quoting
State Senator Bob Hertzberg, who introduced the bill).
70
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17941(a), 17940(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020
Reg. Sess.).
71
Id. § 17942(c).
72
Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act, S. 3127, 115th Cong. § 1 (2018). A similar bill
was introduced in the California Assembly by Marc Levine (D-San Rafael). A.B. 1950, Gen.
Assemb., 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
73
Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act, S. 3127, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).
74
Id. § 4(b).
75
Warner Policy Proposals, supra note 59, at 6.
76
HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GRP. ON A.I., EUR. COMM’N, ETHICS GUIDELINES FOR TRUSTWORTHY
AI 18 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworth
y-ai [https://perma.cc/FWP2-E2CJ]; see also AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER
COMM’N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY: PRELIMINARY REPORT 319 (2018), https://www.accc.
gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20Digital%20Platforms%20Inquiry%20-%20Preliminary%20R
eport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ89-ARCG]. For a particularly relevant section, see id. § 7.3.
77
See, e.g., Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1759, 1787, 1814 (2019)
(discussing solutions such as forensic technology, digital provenance, and authenticated alibi
services).
78
Devin Coldewey, Facebook Is Making Its Own Deepfakes and Offering Prizes for Detecting Them, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 5, 2020, 1:15 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/05/facebo
ok-is-making-its-own-deepfakes-and-offering-prizes-for-detecting-them [https://perma.cc/P8
9F-3MKX].
79
Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act, S. 3805, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018) (would criminalize the creation or distribution of a deep fake that facilitates illegal conduct); see also Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act, H.R. 6607, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018)
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the state level80 would penalize propagators of deepfakes in various circumstances. The most notable federal proposal—the DEEPFAKES Accountability
Act—would address the manipulative possibilities of deepfakes by requiring
anyone creating synthetic media featuring an imposter to disclose that the media was altered or artificially generated.81 Such disclosure would have to be
made through “irremovable digital watermarks, as well as textual descriptions.”82 This sort of “digital provenance” only works if the marks are ubiquitous and unremovable—both of which are unlikely.83 As Devin Coldewey critically observes, “[t]he law here is akin to asking bootleggers to mark their
barrels with their contact information.”84 If it is not effective or enforceable, at
the very least the law serves an expressive purpose by stating (or restating) that
informational fidelity is worth pursuing.
While most of these proposals deal with direct-to-consumer transparency,
there are also new proposed and adopted rules to benefit information intermediaries. There are many versions of an advertising archive requirement.85 The
Honest Ads Act would require platforms to maintain a political ad repository of
all political advertisers that have spent more than $500 on ads or sponsored
posts.86 Canada’s political advertising law also mandates an ad repository.87 On
the state level, the California Disclose Act requires political campaign advertis(would criminalize the intentional publication of false information about elections within
sixty days of an election).
80
A.B. 8155, State Assemb., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 2017) (would extend the right
of publicity such that “an individual’s persona is the personal property of the individual” and
“the use of a digital replica for purposes of trade within an expressive work [absent consent]
shall be a violation” of the act with exceptions for commentary, etc.); A.B. 1280, State Assemb., 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2019) (would criminalize the creation or distribution
of a deep fake that depicts a person engaging in sexual conduct or that intends to coerce or
deceive voters within 60 days of an election); see also S.B. 751, 86th Leg. § 1 (Tex. 2019)
(codified in TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of
the 86th Leg.)) (criminalizing the creation of a deep fake within thirty days of an election
period with the intent to deceive and “influence the outcome of the election”).
81
Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping Exploitation Subject to Accountability Act, H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).
82
Devin Coldewey, DEEPFAKES Accountability Act Would Impose Unenforceable Rules—
but It’s a Start, TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/13/
deepfakes-accountability-act-would-impose-unenforceable-rules-but-its-a-start [https://perm
a.cc/KRH6-RMC2].
83
See Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War,
FOREIGN AFFS. (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-1211/deepfakes-and-new-disinformation-war [https://perma.cc/BP67-6XPM] (expressing skepticism toward the “digital provenance” solution).
84
Coldewey, supra note 82.
85
See generally Paddy Leerssen et al., Platform Ad Archives: Promises and Pitfalls, 8
INTERNET POL’Y REV. (2019) (providing comprehensive review of ad archive developments
in the U.S. and Europe).
86
Honest Ads Act, S. 1356, 116th Cong. § 8 (2019).
87
Elections Modernization Act, Bill C-76 § 208.1 (enacted as S.C. 2018 c 31 (Can.)) (replacing the Fair Elections Act, S.C. 2014, c 12).
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ers to list their top three contributors and requires platforms to maintain a database of political ads run in the state.88 The New York State Democracy Protection Act mandates that political ads be collected in an online archive maintained by the State Board of Elections.89 Washington State requires disclosure
of who paid for a political ad, how much the advertiser spent, the issue or candidate supported by the ad, and the demographics of the targeted audience.90
Much about this adaptation of analog-era transparency rules to digital is
good and necessary. But it will not be sufficient, either as a matter of transparency policy or as more general instrument of digital information fidelity.
III. FIDELITY OF SYSTEM—KNOW WHO THE SYSTEM IS TALKING TO
Digital platforms serve up content and advertising to listeners to capitalize
on cognitive vulnerabilities that have surfaced through pervasive digital surveillance.91 The noise problem on digital platforms is different than on analog
ones in part because the business model pushes content to soft targets, where
cognitive resistance is impaired. Merely updating analog-era transparency rules
as an approach to information fidelity misses this fundamental point about how
digital audiences are selected for content. Analog mass media and advertising
transparency regimes, embodied in such practices as sponsorship identification,
seek to combat manipulation at the level of the message. But digital manipulation transcends the message.92 It is systemic. The actual message is only the end
88

CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 84503–84504.6 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 85 of 2020 Reg.
Sess.).
89
N.Y. ELEC. § 14-107 (McKinney 2020).
90
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345(1) (2020). Hours after the disclosure law went into effect
on June 7, 2018, Washington State’s Public Disclosure Commission issued an emergency
rule clarifying that platforms like Google were subject to it. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-18050(1)–(3) (2020). In response to the new law, Google said it pulled all covered ads. Brunner
& Clarridge, supra note 64. Washington State is suing both Google and Facebook for running political ads without sufficient disclosure. Monica Nickelsburg, Washington State Affirms Rule Requiring Facebook and Google To Make Political Ad Disclosures, GEEKWIRE
(Nov. 29, 2018, 2:42 PM), https://www.geekwire.com/2018/washington-state-affirms-rulerequiring-facebook-google-make-political-ad-disclosures [https://perma.cc/JA8T-SQD2].
91
See, e.g., Karen Yeung, Hypernudge: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design, 20
INFO., COMMC’N & SOC’Y 118, 123–24 (2017); ANTHONY NADLER ET AL., DATA & SOC’Y,
WEAPONIZING THE DIGITAL INFLUENCE MACHINE: THE POLITICAL PERILS OF ONLINE AD TECH
6 (2018), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/DS_Digital_Influence_Machin
e.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YZS-2NA9] (showing how platform advertising systems are “used
to prioritize vulnerability over relevance”).
92
Daniel Susser et al., Technology, Autonomy, and Manipulation, INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 4
(2019) (defining online manipulation as “intentionally and covertly influencing their decision-making, by targeting and exploiting their decision-making vulnerabilities”); see also
Cass Sunstein, Fifty Shades of Manipulation, 1 J. MKTG. BEHAV. 213, 216 (2015) (“I suggest
that an effort to influence people’s choices counts as manipulative to the extent that it does
not sufficiently engage or appeal to their capacity for reflection and deliberation.”); see also
The Ethics of Manipulation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Mar. 22, 2020),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-manipulation/ [https://perma.cc/473Q-BNUE] (con-
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product of a persuasive effort that starts with personal data collection, personal
inferences, amplification, and tailoring of messages to the “right” people, all of
which happens in the dark.93
Advertisers always tried to target segmented audiences with persuasive
messages, but analog technologies offered only scattershot messaging to the
masses. System architecture made it impossible to hide where the messages
went; distribution was evident. All listeners of channel x were exposed to y
content at z moment (give or take some time shifting). On social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, obfuscation and manipulation are emergent
properties of algorithmically mediated speech flows that surface communications based on microtargeting and personal data collection.94 In the current environment, no one can easily solve for x, y, and z. Moreover, people are ill
equipped to filter out noise in light of digital design features that depress cognitive autonomy, as discussed below.95 Manipulation in this context resides not
only in the individual messages but also in the algorithmic production of salience. Transparency mechanisms designed mainly to strengthen cognitive resistance to discrete messages will not be enough to secure freedom of mind.
Policy should boost signal throughout the system, through transparency and
other means.
A. Algorithmic Noise
As Julie E. Cohen observes,
Algorithmic mediation of information flows intended to target controversial material to receptive audiences . . . inculcating resistance to facts that contradict
preferred narratives, and encouraging demonization and abuse. . . . New data
harvesting techniques designed to detect users’ moods and emotions . . . exacerbate these problems; increasingly, today’s networked information flows are optimized for subconscious, affective appeal.96

She is touching on a complex of problems related to polarization, outrage,
and filter bubbles. Platforms systematically demote values of information fidelity. There is a collapse of context between paid advertisements and organic
content, between real and false news, between peer and paid-for recommendations. Jonathan Albright describes a “micro-propaganda machine” of “behavtrasting rational persuasion with manipulation); Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in
the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 157, 158 (2019).
93
See NADLER ET AL., supra note 91, at 1 (identifying three stages in the “digital influence
machine”: the development of “detailed consumer profiles;” the capacity “[t]o target customized audiences, or publics, with strategic messaging across devices, channels, and contexts;”
and the capacity “[t]o automate and optimize tactical elements of influence campaigns, leveraging consumer data and real-time feedback to test and tweak key variables including the
composition of target publics and the timing, placement, and content of ad messages”).
94
See, e.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US
AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 6 (2018).
95
Infra Section III.A.
96
Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 150 (2017).
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ioral micro-targeting and emotional manipulation—data-driven ‘psyops’” “that
can tailor people’s opinions, emotional reactions, and create ‘viral’ sharing
(😆LOL/haha/😡RAGE) episodes around what should be serious or contemplative issues.”97
Platform algorithms boost noise through the system as a byproduct of the
main aim: engagement (subject to some recent alterations to content moderation practices). In order to maximize and monetize attention capture, the major
digital platforms serve up “sticky” content predicted to appeal based on personal data.98 Dipayan Ghosh writes that “[b]ecause there is no earnest consideration of what consumers wish to or should see in this equation, they are subjected to whatever content the platform believes will maximize profits.”99
Platforms understand what content will maximize engagement through a process of data harvesting that Mark Andrejevic has called “digital enclosure.”100
Algorithmic promotion is abetted, often unwittingly, by the users themselves,
who are nudged to amplify messages that on reflection they might abjure. In
this respect, users are manipulated not (or not only) via a specific message but
through technical affordances that drive them into message streams without
care for message quality. This production of salience happens below the level
of the message. Listeners relate to information unaware of the digital undertow.
The Council of Europe directly confronted the ways in which platform design undermines cognitive autonomy in its 2019 Declaration on the Manipulative Capabilities of Algorithmic Processes.101 Machine learning tools, the
Council said, have the “capacity not only to predict choices but also to influence emotions and thoughts and alter an anticipated course of action, some-

97

Jonathan Albright, The #Election2016 Micro-Propaganda Machine, MEDIUM (Nov. 18,
2016), https://medium.com/@d1gi/the-election2016-micro-propaganda-machine-383449cc1f
ba [https://perma.cc/58ZV-8ZAZ]; see also NADLER ET AL., supra note 91, at 32 (“Many of
the most popular social media interfaces are designed in ways that favor the spread of content triggering quick, emotionally intense responses.” (citing Kerry Jones, et al., The Emotional Combinations That Make Stories Go Viral, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 23, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/05/research-the-link-between-feeling-in-control-and-viral-content
[https://perma.cc/XDS2-CCBK]; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 94, at 138)).
98
See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1015
(2014).
99
Dipayan Ghosh, Facebook’s Oversight Board Is Not Enough, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 16,
2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/facebooks-oversight-board-is-not-enough [https://perma.cc/T
C8U-YSQB].
100
Mark Andrejevic, Privacy, Exploitation, and the Digital Enclosure, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F.
47, 53 (2009) (defining “digital disclosure” as being “the creation of an interactive realm
wherein every action, interaction, and transaction generates information about itself”) (drawing on James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33).
101
Committee of Ministers, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on the Manipulative
Capabilities of Algorithmic Processes, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://search.coe.i
nt/cm/pages/result_details.aspx?objectid=090000168092dd4b [https://perma.cc/YFP9-RZN
Z].
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times subliminally.”102 The Declaration further states that “[f]ine grained, subconscious and [personalized] levels of algorithmic persuasion may have significant effects on the cognitive autonomy of individuals and their right to form
opinions and take independent decisions.”103 The Declaration’s supposition is
supported by research showing how digital speech flows are shaped by data
harvesting and algorithmically driven and relentlessly monetized platform mediation.104
Platform priorities and architecture have reshaped public discourse in ways
that individual users cannot see and may not want.105 Platforms flatten out the
information terrain so that all communications in theory have equal weight,
with high-fidelity messages served up on a par with misinformation of all
kinds. This is sometimes called context collapse.106 Stories posted on social
media or surfaced through voice command are often denuded of credibility tokens or origination detail, like sponsorship and authorship, making it hard to
distinguish between fact and fable, high fidelity and low.107

102

Id.
Id.; COMM. OF EXPERTS ON HUMAN RTS. DIMENSIONS OF AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING
& DIFFERENT FORMS OF A.I., COUNCIL OF EUR., DRAFT DECLARATION OF THE COMMITTEE OF
MINISTERS ON THE MANIPULATIVE CAPABILITIES OF ALGORITHMIC PROCESSES (2018),
https://rm.coe.int/draft-declaration-on-the-manipulative-capabilities-of-algorithmic-proc/168
08ef257 [https://perma.cc/XM52-QFLJ].
104
See TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT
MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 138 (2018).
105
DIPAYAN GHOSH & BEN SCOTT, NEW AMERICA, #DIGITALDECEIT: THE TECHNOLOGIES
BEHIND PRECISION PROPAGANDA ON THE INTERNET 2 (2018); Daniel Susser et al., Online
Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 2 (2019) [hereinafter Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences]; ALICE MARWICK & REBECCA LEWIS, DATA
& SOC’Y, MEDIA MANIPULATION AND DISINFORMATION ONLINE 3 (2017), https://datasociety.
net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/R5NS-G9G9]; see also HIGH LEVEL GRP. ON FAKE NEWS & ONLINE DISINFORMATION,
EUR. COMM’N, A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO DISINFORMATION 10 (2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fakenews-and-online-disinformation [https://perma.cc/UKL3-WVWQ]; U.K. SEC’Y OF STATE
FOR DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT & THE SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T,
ONLINE HARMS WHITE PAPER 3, 5 (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/governme
nt/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/793360/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf [ht
tps://perma.cc/W5Z5-JPUC]; CLAIRE WARDLE & HOSSEIN DERAKHSHAN, INFORMATION
DISORDER: TOWARD AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY
MAKING 10, 12 (2017), https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinaryframework-for-researc/168076277c [https://perma.cc/88TV-C8RM].
106
Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: Twitter Users,
Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience, 13 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 114, 122 (2010);
Carolyn Marvin, Your Smart Phones Are Hot Pockets to Us: Context Collapse in a Mobilized Age, 1 MOBILE MEDIA & COMMC’N 153, 154 (2013).
107
STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & THE STATE, STIGLER COMM. ON DIGITAL
PLATFORMS, FINAL REPORT 165–66 (2019), https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/resear
ch/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---committee-report---stigler-center.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJ
35-RKZG].
103

21 NEV. L.J. 623

Spring 2021]

DIGITAL FIDELITY AND FRICTION

641

Listeners face this material in vulnerable states, by design. Platforms in
pursuit of engagement may pair users with content in order to exploit users’
cognitive weaknesses or predispositions. Design tricks like the “infinite scroll”
keep people engaged while blunting their defenses to credibility signals.108
YouTube autoplay queues up video suggestions to carry viewers deeper into
content verticals that are often manipulative or otherwise low-fidelity.109 Social
bots exploit feelings of tribalism and a “hive mind” logic to enlist people into
amplifying information, again without regard to information fidelity.110
Other design features like notifications and the quantification of “likes” or
“follows” trigger dopamine hits to hook users to their apps.111 Gratification
from these hits pushes people to share information that will garner a reaction.112
On top of this, Facebook’s News Feed and YouTube’s Suggested Videos use
predictive analytics to promote virality through a user’s network.113 These

108

Anastasia Kozyreva et al., Citizens Versus the Internet: Confronting Digital Challenges
with Cognitive Tools, 21 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 103, 112 (2020).
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REACTIONARY RIGHT ON YOUTUBE 36 (2018), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/201
8/09/DS_Alternative_Influence.pdf [https://perma.cc/658P-CSYJ]; Kevin Roose, The Making of a YouTube Radical, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2019/06/08/technology/youtube-radical.html [https://perma.cc/5ZE5-LA5T]. But cf. Kevin
Munger & Joseph Phillips, A Supply and Demand Framework for YouTube Politics (Oct. 1,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://osf.io/73jys/ [https://perma.cc/P64D-5UL3] (casting
doubt on the algorithmic radicalization theory that platforms create demand for disinformation, and suggesting instead that they simply supply existing demand).
110
Chengcheng Shao et al., The Spread of Low-Credibility Content by Social Bots, 9
NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 5 (2018) (“[B]ots are particularly active in amplifying [fake news] in
the very early spreading moments.”).
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See Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 129,
145 (2019) (“After sinking [energy] into the product, the user becomes ‘internally triggered’
to come back and check on its performance: Who commented? What did they say? How
many likes?”); Simon Parkin, Has Dopamine Got Us Hooked on Tech?, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 4, 2018, 4:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/04/has-dopam
ine-got-us-hooked-on-tech-facebook-apps-addiction [https://perma.cc/3F8M-G736]. See
generally B.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE
THINK AND DO (2003); CTR. FOR HUMANE TECH., Technology Is Downgrading Humanity:
Let's Reverse That Trend Now, MEDIUM (July 17, 2019), https://medium.com/@HumaneTec
h_/technology-is-downgrading-humanity-lets-reverse-that-trend-now-893fb9f6e580 [https://
perma.cc/FPC6-APLF].
112
See Langvardt, supra note 111, at 142.
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James Grimmelmann, The Platform Is the Message, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 217, 227
(2018) (“[P]latforms tend to promote content that already has the characteristics that promote
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tricks are among what are called “dark pattern” design elements.114 They are
hidden or structurally embedded techniques that lower cognitive resistance, encouraging a sort of numb consumption and automatic amplification while at the
same time facilitating more data collection, which supports more targeted content delivery, and so on.115
That these design features can be responsible for lowering information fidelity is something the platforms themselves recognize. Under pressure from
legislators, Facebook in 2017 said that it would block the activity of government and nonstate actors to “distort domestic or foreign political sentiment”
and “[c]oordinated activity by inauthentic accounts with the intent of manipulating political discussion.”116 In other words, the platform would work to depress noise. But this reference to “distortion” assumes a baseline of signal that
the platform has not consistently supported. Its strategies with respect to news
zig-zag in ways that have undermined the salience of high-quality information.
Emily Bell and her team at Columbia University’s Tow Center for Digital
Journalism have chronicled how Facebook policies influence news providers,
getting them to invest in algorithmically desirable content (including, for a
while, video), only to abruptly change directions, scrambling editorial policies
and wasting resources.117 Facebook decided in 2018 to demote news as compared with “friends and family” posts118 and then the next year created a privileged place for select journalism outlets in the News Tab.119 Policies that are
114

CHRIS LEWIS, IRRESISTIBLE
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APPS: MOTIVATIONAL DESIGN PATTERNS FOR APPS, GAMES,
99–110 (2014).
115
Id. at 6–7, 103–10; Zeynep Tufekci, YouTube, the Great Radicalizer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.ht
ml?searchResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/HC8V-9Y6S].
116
Bethania Palma, Facebook Introduces Measure to Block Advertisements from Sites That
Share Fake News, SNOPES (Aug. 28 2017), https://www.snopes.com/news/2017/08/28/faceb
oo-to-block-ads-fake-news/ [https://perma.cc/S2J7-TPK3]; Satwik Shukla & Tessa Lyons,
Blocking Ads from Pages That Repeatedly Share False News, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug.
28, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/08/blocking-ads-from-pages-that-repeatedlyshare-false-news/ [https://perma.cc/7WQE-66GS]. Two years later, Facebook refused to remove advertisements of the Trump presidential campaign that were widely considered to be
misleading. Craig Timburg et al., A Facebook Policy Lets Politicians Lie in Ads, Leaving
Democrats Fearing What Trump Will Do, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2019, 1:31 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/10/facebook-policy-political-speechlets-politicians-lie-ads/ [https://perma.cc/D5ZD-WAUJ].
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NUSHIN RASHIDIAN ET AL., TOW CTR. FOR DIGIT. JOURNALISM, FRIEND AND FOE: THE
PLATFORM PRESS AT THE HEART OF JOURNALISM (2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_rep
orts/the-platform-press-at-the-heart-of-journalism.php [https://perma.cc/MF5Z-WD47].
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Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/101
04413015393571 [https://perma.cc/6HKL-D3XH]. For the change’s impact on publishers,
see Josh Constine, How Facebook Stole the News Business, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 3, 2018,
9:10 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/03/facebooks-siren-call/ [https://perma.cc/X53K9SAB].
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See Casey Newton, A New Facebook News Tab Is Starting to Roll Out in the United
States, THE VERGE (Oct. 25, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/25/209306
64/facebook-news-tab-launch-united-states-test [https://perma.cc/VEG4-H3BM].

21 NEV. L.J. 623

Spring 2021]

DIGITAL FIDELITY AND FRICTION

643

both erratic and truth-agnostic allow noise generators, through the canny use of
amplification techniques, to manipulate sentiment without resorting to inauthenticity. Facebook’s editorial policies and their fluidity have led to criticisms
that the process is lacking in transparency and accountability.120
Platform design features have to be understood against the platforms’
background entitlements and resulting norms. The most significant entitlement
is their immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.121
This provision holds platforms harmless for most of the content they transmit,
freeing them from the liability that other media distributors may face for propagating harms.122 It is not surprising, then, given the legal landscape, that the
platforms have not developed a strong culture of editorial conscience. They
have grown up without anything like a robust tradition of making editorial
choices in the public interest, of clearly separating advertising from other content, of considering information needs, or of worrying that they might lose their
license to operate.
All of these features—business models, architecture, traditions, and regulation—combine with the sheer volume of message exposure to limit the effectiveness of message-level disclosure in digital flows.
B. Systemic Transparency
For disclosures to enhance digital information fidelity, it will require more
than message-level transparency. There are at least two reasons to look further
down the stack toward greater system-level transparency.123
The first reason is that message labels may not be effective counters to manipulation, given the volume and velocity of digital messaging. In studies of
false news, researchers have found that users repeatedly exposed to false headlines on social media perceive them as substantially accurate even when they
are clearly implausible.124 Warning labels about the headlines being incorrect
120

See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018).
121
47 U.S.C. § 230; see ELLEN P. GOODMAN & RYAN WHITTINGTON, GERMAN MARSHALL
FUND, No. 20, SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND THE FUTURE OF
ONLINE SPEECH 2–3 (2019), http://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/publications/pdf/Good
man%20%20Whittington%20-%20Section%20230%20paper%20-%209%20Aug.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/8E8P-H3Y4].
122
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, EFF,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/H25S-7BNQ].
123
But see Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the
Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA &
SOC’Y 973, 973 (2018) (calling into question transparency as an effective policy lever for
digital platforms).
124
See, e.g., Gordon Pennycook & David G. Rand, Who Falls for Fake News? The Roles of
Bullshit Receptivity, Overclaiming, Familiarity, and Analytic Thinking, 88 J. PERSONALITY
185, 186 (2020); Emily Thorson, Belief Echoes: The Persistent Effects of Corrected Misinformation, 33 POL. COMMC’N 460, 475–76 (2016).
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had no effect on perceptions of credibility or even caused people to share the
information more often.125 The frictionless sharing that digital platforms enable
may simply overwhelm signifiers of compromised informational integrity delivered at the point of consumption.
In important ways, by the time the message is delivered to the user, meaning has already been made. The messages on the surface are epiphenomenal of
algorithmic choices made below. This is the second reason to push transparency mandates to lower down in the stack where algorithmic amplification decisions reside. How can we render visible the “authorship” of information flows?
It’s not enough for the individual to know who is messaging her. What is trending and what messages are reaching which populations are a function of algorithmic ordering and behavioral nudges hidden from view.126 Salience is a
product of these systemic choices.
European governments are trying to address algorithmic manipulation
through transparency rules geared to the algorithmic production of salience.
Among other regulators, the UK Electoral Commission aspires to fill in the lacunae of campaign ad microtargeting, where “[o]nly the company and the campaigner know why a voter was targeted and how much was spent on a particular campaign.”127 A report commissioned by the French government has
proposed “prescriptive regulation” that obliges platforms to be transparent
about “the function of ordering content,” among other features.128 This includes
transparency about “the methods of presentation, prioritisation and targeting of
the content published by the users, including when they are promoted by the
platform or by a third party in return for remuneration.”129 Similarly, a UK Parliament Committee report in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal
has recommended that “[t]here should be full disclosure of the targeting used as
part of advertising transparency” and that “[p]olitical advertising items should
be publicly accessible in a searchable repository—who is paying for the ads,
which organisations are sponsoring the ad, who is being targeted by the ads.”130
125
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COMMC’N 1526, 1531 (2019); see also Grimmelmann, supra note 113, at 228;
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 94, at 8–9.
127
DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT COMM., HOUSE OF COMMONS, HC 1791,
DISINFORMATION AND ‘FAKE NEWS’: FINAL REPORT 2017-19, at 59 (2019) (UK) [hereinafter
UK Fake News Report], https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumed
s/1791/1791.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW3J-KVKK] (citation omitted).
128
FRENCH SEC’Y OF STATE FOR DIGIT. AFFS, CREATING A FRENCH FRAMEWORK TO MAKE
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS MORE ACCOUNTABLE: ACTING IN FRANCE WITH A EUROPEAN
VISION 20 (2019), https://www.numerique.gouv.fr/uploads/Regulation-of-social-networks_M
ission-report_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL24-3ZLR].
129
Id.
130
UK Fake News Report, supra note 127, at 61, 63.

21 NEV. L.J. 623

Spring 2021]

DIGITAL FIDELITY AND FRICTION

645

Maryland’s electioneering transparency law would also have mandated extensive disclosure of election ad reach131 but was held unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.132
Drawing on these and other proposed interventions, we can identify systemic transparency touchstones. Some of these can be addressed by platform
disclosure, others only by making data available for third-party auditing. When
Facebook was interrogated by the U.S. Congress over Russian interference in
the 2016 election, it showed itself capable of disclosing a lot of information
about data flows.133 This is the kind of information that should be routinely disclosed at least with respect to certain categories of paid promotion.134
Items that should be made known or knowable by independent auditors include:
• The reach of election-related political advertisements, paid and organic,
and revenue figures;
• The reach of promoted content over a certain threshold;
• The platforms’ course of conduct with respect to violations of their own
terms of service and community standards, including decisions not to
downrank or remove content that has been flagged for violations;
• The use of human subjects to test messaging techniques by advertisers
and platforms (also known as A/B testing);
• Change logs recording the alterations platforms make to their content and
amplification policies;
• “Know Your Customer” information about who really is behind the purchases of political advertising.
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IV. NOISE REDUCTION VIA FRICTION
Alongside new forms of systemic transparency, other changes to system
design are needed to promote signal over noise. Of course, investing in and
promoting fact-based journalism is important to boosting signal.135 Changes to
platform moderation, amplification, and transparency policies can help to depress noise. But ultimately, it is the individual who must identify signal; communications systems can only be designed to assist the exercise of cognitive
autonomy. I suggest that communicative friction is a design feature to support
cognitive autonomy. Indeed, one way to see analog-era transparency requirements is as messaging ballast—cognitive speed bumps of sorts. Slow media,
like slow food, may deliver sociopolitical benefits that compensate for efficiency losses. What might such speed bumps look like in the digital realm? This
part briefly characterizes the shift to frictionless digital communications and
concludes with some ideas for strategically increasing friction in information
flows to benefit information fidelity.
A. From Analog-Era Friction to Digital Frictionlessness
The analog world was naturally frictive in the delivery of information and
production of salience. Sources of friction were varied, including barriers to entry to production and distribution, as well as inefficient markets. It was costly
to sponsor a message and to distribute content on electronic media. And it was
a “drag”—as in, full of friction—for an individual to circulate content, requiring as it did access to relatively scarce distribution media. Friction protected
markets for legacy media companies. This was undesirable in all kinds of ways.
But one of the benefits was that these companies invested in high-cost journalism and policed disinformation.136
Friction was built into the analog-era business models and technology,
some of which was discussed earlier.137 Relatively meager (by comparison to
digital) content offerings were bundled for mass consumption and therefore
were imperfectly tailored to individual preferences. By dint of this bundling in
channels, networks, and newspapers, advertisers ended up supporting highfidelity information along with reporting on popular topics like sports and entertainment.138 Content scarcity, crude market segmentation, and imperfect targeting of advertising support all served as impediments to the most efficient
matching of taste and message; technological friction impeded virality.139 Ana135
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log communications system inefficiencies and limitations did not necessarily
promote information fidelity. After all, both information and disinformation
campaigns, truth-tellers and liars, would have to overcome obstacles to persuasion. But the friction slowed message transmission to allow for rational consideration. Research on polarization suggests that when people have more time for
deliberation, they tend to think more freely and resist misleading messaging.140
Some of the friction in analog media was regulatory, including the message-level sponsorship disclosure requirements described above.141 A message
that says “I’m Sally Candidate, and I approved this ad” forces the listener to
stop before fully processing the ad to consider its meaning. It is a flag on the
field, stalling the flow of information between message and mind. That disclosures have the effect of cluttering speech is a knock against them in the literature on transparency policy. Listeners may be so overloaded with information
that they don’t heed the disclosures. 142 Their minds may not be open to hearing
whatever it is the disclosure wants them to know.143 It is nevertheless possible
that disclosures can function as salubrious friction, simply by flashing warning.
In their paper on online manipulation, Daniel Susser and co-authors note that
disclosures serve just such a function, encouraging “individuals to slow down,
reflect on, and make more informed decisions.”144
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Digital platforms dismantle cognitive checkpoints along with other obstacles to information flows. For the engineer, friction is “any sort of irritating obstacle” to be overcome.145 This engineering mindset converged with democratic
hopes for an open internet to produce a vision of better information fidelity. For
example, by tearing down barriers to entry, digital could amplify “We the media,” to cite Dan Gillmor’s 2005 book of the same name.146 Decentralized media authority, it was hoped, would reveal truths through distributed networks,
leading to a kind of collaborative “self-righting.”147 Building on his earlier
work on networked peer production, Yochai Benkler conceptualized a
“networked Fourth Estate”148 that took on the watchdog function of the legacy
press. Reduced communicative friction did open opportunities for the voiceless.
But the optimism of the early 2010s did not account for the collapse of legacy
media as a source of signal or for how commercial platforms would amplify
noise. Citizen journalists might take advantage of frictionless communications,
but not nearly to the same degree as malicious actors and market players,
whose objectives were very different.
B. New Frictions
Digital enclosure seals communicators in feedback loops of data that are
harvested from attention and then used to deliver content back to data subjects
in an endless scroll. Platforms have bulldozed the sources of friction that were
able to disrupt the loop. When twentieth-century highway builders bulldozed
neighborhoods to foster frictionless travel, place-making urbanists like Jane Jacobs articulated how the collision of different uses—something many planners
considered inefficient—improves communities.149 The sociologist Richard
Sennett used “friction” to describe aspects of this urban phenomenon, which he
viewed favorably.150 In communications as in urbanism, a certain degree of
friction can disrupt the most efficient matching of message and mind in ways
that promote wellbeing. Specifically, new frictions can promote information
fidelity. Indeed, given the First Amendment limitations on any regulatory response to noisy communications, the introduction of content-neutral frictions
may be one of the very few regulatory interventions that are consistent with
American free speech traditions.
145
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The use of friction already is both a public policy and private management
strategy in the digital realm. Paul Ohm and Jonathan Frankle have explored
digital systems that implement inefficient solutions to advance non-efficiency
values—what they term desirable inefficiency.151 The platforms themselves are
voluntarily moving to implement frictive solutions. For example, WhatsApp
decided in 2019 to limit bulk message forwarding so as to reduce the harms
caused by the frictionless sharing of disinformation.152 The limit imposes higher cognitive and logistical burdens on those who would amplify the noise. At
the extreme, friction becomes prohibition, which is one way to think about
Twitter’s decision to reject political advertising because it did not want to, or
believed it could not, reduce the noise.153
Forms of friction that could enhance information fidelity and cognitive autonomy include communication delays, virality disruptions, and taxes.
Communication Delays. The columnist Farhad Manjoo has written, “If I
were king of the internet, I would impose an ironclad rule: No one is allowed to
share any piece of content without waiting a day to think it over.”154 He assumes that people will incline toward information fidelity if encouraged to exercise cognitive autonomy. This intuition is supported by research showing that
individuals are more likely to resist manipulative communications when they
have the mental space and inclination to raise cognitive defenses.155 Are there
ways to systematize this sort of “pause” to cue consideration? Other examples
of intentional communications delays adopted as sources of felicitous friction
suggest that there are. For reasons of quality control, for example, broadcasters
have imposed a short delay (usually five to seven seconds) in the transmission
of live broadcasts. Frictionless communications, when it is only selectively
available, can reduce faith in markets. For this reason, the IEX stock exchange
151
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runs all trades through extra cable so that more proximate traders have no
communications advantage, thereby protecting faith in the integrity of their
market.156
As discussed above, platforms deploy dark patterns to spike engagement.
Businesses routinely ask, “Are you sure you want to unsubscribe?” It should be
possible for platforms to use these techniques to slow down communications:
“Are you sure you want to share this?” Twitter has begun to add sources of
friction by getting users to “quote-tweet” rather than merely retweet – a practice which encourages users to actually stop and read or watch what they are
circulating instead of being moved by fast-twitch impulse to share.157 Senator
Josh Hawley’s proposed Social Media Addiction Reduction Technology Act
would require platforms to slow down speech transmission as a matter of
law.158 The Act would make it unlawful for a “social media company” to deploy an “infinite scroll or auto refill,” among other techniques that blow past
the “natural stopping points” for content consumption.159 While the bill has
problems of conception and execution, it touches on some of the ways that platforms might be redesigned with friction to enhance cognitive autonomy.160
Commentators have suggested other ways that Congress could deter platform
practices that subvert individual choice.161
According to research on design frictions, these small obstacles placed in
the way to slow down activity are known as “microboundaries.”162 There is a
rich design tradition around “slow technology” that seeks to encourage consideration, as opposed to fast-twitch reaction.163 Microboundaries between one
thing and the next are a slow technology tool manifest in such interstitial queries as “are you sure you want to delete?” or “are you sure you want to re156
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tweet?” In social media, microboundaries introduce a brief pause between first
exposure and belief formation, reaction, or transmission. Early research suggests that the introduction of design friction in mobile technologies to foster reflection “increases the level on understanding of user’s interaction with an application . . . [and] leads to a higher level of satisfaction.”164
Virality Disruptors. Many forms of noise overwhelm signal only at scale,
when the communications go viral. One way to deal with virality is to impose a
duty on platforms to disrupt traffic at a certain threshold of circulation. At that
point, human review would be required to assess the communication for compliance with applicable laws and platform standards. Pausing waves of virality
could stem disinformation, deepfakes, bot-generated speech, and other categories of information especially likely to manipulate listeners. The disruption itself, combined with the opportunity to moderate the content or remove it, could
reduce the salience of low-fidelity communication. Another approach is something like the sharing limit that WhatsApp imposed to increase friction around
amplification.165
Substitute volatility for virality, and it’s easy to see how the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission deploys friction. At a certain threshold of volatility
in financial markets, it will curb trading to prevent market panic, in effect imposing a trip wire to stop information flows likely to overwhelm cognitive
checks.166 The New York Stock Exchange adopted these circuit-breakers in reaction to the 1987 market crash caused by high-volatility trading.167 Other
countries quickly followed suit to impose friction on algorithmic trading when
it moves so fast as to threaten precipitous market drops.168 The purpose of these
circuit-breakers, in the view of the New York Stock Exchange, is to give investors “time to assimilate incoming information and the ability to make informed
choices during periods of high market volatility.”169 That is, it was expressly to
create the space for the exercise of cognitive autonomy. Social media platforms
164
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should consider adopting a circuit breaker to pause the circulation of misinformation once the traffic hits some threshold of “virality.”170 Amidst surges of
misinformation about the Coronavirus, Facebook announced that it was piloting
this approach.171
Taxes. Taxes are also sources of friction that can be deployed to disincentivize business practices that boost noise over signal. Tal Zarsky has called data
the “fuel” powering online manipulation.172 If so, a tax on data could aid in resistance to manipulation. There are a number of nascent proposals to put a price
on exploitative data practices. One possibility, for example, would be to impose
a “pollution tax” on platform data sharing.173 Another is to have a transaction
tax for advertising on platforms.174 Maryland is the first state to consider legislation introducing such a tax to raise revenue for education.175 These kinds of
taxes, if well crafted to withstand Constitutional scrutiny, would begin to make
companies internalize the costs of exploitative data practices. If set to the right
level, they could attract platforms and online information providers away from
advertising models that monetize attention and finance the noisy digital undertow. Taxes would have the additional benefit of raising revenue that could be
used to support signal-producing journalism, resulting in higher-fidelity speech.
CONCLUSION
It is long overdue that media transparency requirements from the analog
world be adapted for digital platforms. Informing listeners about who is speaking to them—whether candidate, company, or bot—helps them to make sense
of messages and discern signal from noise. But this kind of message-level
transparency will not suffice either to protect cognitive autonomy or to promote
information fidelity in the digital world. The sources of manipulation and misinformation often lie deeper in digital flows. By serving up content to optimize
170
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time spent on the platform and segment audiences for advertisers, at a volume
and velocity that overwhelms cognitive defenses, digital platform design prioritizes content without regard to values of truth, exposure to difference, or democratic discourse. The algorithmic production of meaning hides not only who is
speaking but also who is being spoken to. To really increase the transparency of
communications in digital flows, interventions should focus on system-level
reach and amplification, along with message-level authorship. Research suggests that transparency may have limited impact, especially in light of the volume and velocity of speech. Thus, in addition to transparency, policymakers
and platform designers should consider introducing forms of friction to disrupt
the production of noise in a way that respects First Amendment traditions.
These could include communications delays, virality disruptors, and taxes.
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